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One prominent feature of human conscious experience is mind-wandering, the automatic drift of
attention away from an ongoing task toward thoughts often completely unrelated to the task at
hand (e.g., thinking about running while reading a manuscript; Antrobus et al., 1966; Christoff
et al., 2016). Humans spend about 25–50% of their daily lives mind-wandering (Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010), with obvious disadvantages for performance on ongoing tasks (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2015). We do not mind-wander so frequently because it is fun. In fact, mind-wandering
most often causes bad mood, regardless of whether the content of off-task thoughts was negative or
positive (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Rather, mind-wandering may be adaptive. For example,
after an incubation period filled with a trivial task promoting mind-wandering, individuals
were better at conceiving unusual uses of common objects, as if mind-wandering favored the
unconscious, unconstrained interaction of multiple, distant concepts typical of creative thinking
(Baird et al., 2012). This advantage was not observed if during the incubation period participants
rested, possibly because rest increases the tendency to think (consciously) about the terms of the
problem, constraining excessively the content of thought.
Mind-wandering may have an internal origin (be self-initiated), but it can also be triggered by
external cues (e.g., reading the word “experiment” leads to think to try and become a runner; e.g.,
McVay and Kane, 2013; Maillet et al., 2017; Vannucci et al., 2017). Once initiated, either because
internally or externally cued, mind-wandering tends to unfold in a rather unconstrained fashion,
with a peculiar phenomenology consisting—to say it with James (1890)—of birds’ perchings and
flights, with perchings being the discrete contents of thought on which memory retrieval converges
(and attention focuses), and flights being the transitions of attention from one content to the
next. How do we mind-wander? Which brain regions and dynamics govern the triggering of
mind-wandering and its trajectories in the space of thoughts?
In the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in the cognitive and neural
mechanisms of mind-wandering and other forms of spontaneous cognition, after the field
had been dominated by the study of goal-directed cognition. Functional neuroimaging (fMRI)
evidence indicates that mind-wandering is associated with activity in the “default network,” a
set of interconnected brain regions, including the medial temporal lobes (MTLs), ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), posterior cingulate cortex, and the angular gyrus, whose activity is
enhanced during relatively passive states and internally focused thought (Buckner et al., 2008;
Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2015). According to one prominent
view, activity in the default network is related to the production of the mental contents
populating mind-wandering, with separate subsystems mediating the memory-based construction
of mental events and their self-relevant connotation (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). An alternative
view, sprung from the observation that the default network is active during the unfocused
monitoring of external events (Gilbert et al., 2006a), is that activity in this network does not
necessarily reflect mind-wandering, but, more in general, the capture of attention by salient
task-unrelated stimuli, which also includes external distractions (e.g., noises). This latter view
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relates to the “gateway hypothesis” of medial prefrontal cortex
as implicated in orchestrating the allocation of attention between
internal and external events, and its monitoring/awareness
(Gilbert et al., 2006b). There is initial fMRI evidence, however,
that medial prefrontal cortex is generally more engaged by
mind-wandering than by external distractions, though different
subregions of medial prefrontal cortex respond preferentially to
different forms of distraction (Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
One important question is whether activity in key nodes
of the brain default network is necessary for mind-wandering.
Lesion studies can relate brain activity causally with behavior,
and constrain the interpretation of the function of targeted brain
regions in a way that is not possible with neuroimaging data
alone. The results from two neuropsychological studies of mind-
wandering in patients with bilateral damage in vmPFC vs. the
hippocampus are initial evidence that these two regions play
necessary but distinct roles in mind-wandering. Bertossi and
Ciaramelli (2016) had vmPFC patients and brain-damaged and
healthy controls perform various tasks varying in difficulty, hence
conduciveness to mind-wandering. Across tasks, participants
were occasionally probed to report whether their thoughts had
been fully on-task or, to some extent, off-task, and about the
contents of off-task thoughts. They found that vmPFC patients
showed a reduced frequency of mind-wandering, and, when
they did mind-wander, their thoughts were mostly about the
present, never about the future. Interestingly, vmPFC damage
did not change the frequency with which participants claimed
they were unaware of the content of their off-task thoughts,
suggesting it caused impaired construction, not meta-awareness,
of mind-wandering contents (see also Bertossi et al., 2017). We
are currently collecting indirect (physiological) indices of mind-
wandering in vmPFC patients to clarify whether lack of meta-
awareness contributed to reduced mind-wandering. McCormick
et al. (2018b), on the other hand, examined mind-wandering
in patients with hippocampal damage probing the contents of
their thoughts over a 2-day period. They found that hippocampal
patients reported mind-wandering as frequently as controls.
However, off-task thoughts were context-rich (episodic) in
healthy controls, but semanticized and mainly present-oriented
in hippocampal patients. Although the designs of the two studies
differs, the results suggest that vmPFC patients are impaired
at decoupling from the external environment and initiating
mind-wandering, whereas hippocampal patients do engage in
mind-wandering, but have it devoid of episodic content. We
tentatively proposed, therefore, that during mind-wandering
(as well as voluntary event construction), vmPFC initiates
the construction of events alternative to direct (perceptual)
experience, by coordinating the activation of relevant schemata
(e.g., the park where I run; Gilboa and Marlatte, 2017), which the
hippocampus uses to build a rudimentary sketch of the event.
vmPFC would then help fill the mental event by engaging in
iterative retrieval and integration of schema-congruent elements
via feedback loops with the hippocampus and neocortex (e.g.,
what typically happens when I run; see also Benoit et al., 2014;
Moscovitch et al., 2016; McCormick et al., 2018a).
Yet, vmPFC patients may not be pervasively unable to
mind-wander. Ciaramelli and Ghetti (2007) observed that in
recognition memory tasks vmPFC patients tend to falsely
recognize test (distractor) items because they make vivid but
task-irrelevant associations during retrieval (e.g., I remember
the word CUP because I bought a red cup in London).
These vivid associations may in fact be instances of externally-
triggered mind-wandering, and evidence that this form of mind-
wandering is still possible following vmPFC damage, consistent
with fMRI evidence (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Similarly, in explicit
memory tasks, vmPFC patients may fail to retrieve any memory,
and then start confabulating floridly if probed (Moscovitch and
Melo, 1997). Thus, vmPFC patients’ mind-wandering and event
construction seem to depend critically on the presence of external
cues, whose availability determines striking qualitative changes in
patients’ behavior.
Another dissociation between vmPFC and hippocampal
patients is worth mentioning here. Kurczek et al. (2015)
investigated episodic remembering and future thinking in
vmPFC vs. hippocampal patients by having them first produce
past/future events and then select one moment from the
event and describe it in detail. Individuals with MTLs damage
were unable to describe such moments in detail, but vmPFC
patients could. In another study, however, Bertossi et al. (2016)
required vmPFC patients to construct entire past and future
events, and found a striking impairment. These findings suggest
that hippocampal patients are impaired in conjuring up even
single scenes/moments from an event, while vmPFC patients
may be impaired in constructing extended events (McCormick
et al., 2018a). This dissociation, too, points to differences in
the role of vmPFC and the hippocampus in the dynamic
construction of the flow of thoughts, with the hippocampus
contributing the discrete contents of events (the perchings) and
vmPFC prescribing the appropriate transition between moments
of the events (the flights). What is unclear is what allows
vmPFC and the hippocampus to contribute to mind-wander
differentially, whether their specialized internal organization or
merely their sitting at the appropriate confluence of the relevant
information streams. Characterizing the cortical dynamics of
mind-wandering may be helped by combining behavioral studies
in brain-lesioned patients with mathematically defined network
models incorporating core principles of cortical organization.
Comparing the functional contribution of vmPFC and the
hippocampus acquires extra significance, given the contrast
between the neocortical architecture of the former vs. the peculiar
internal organization of the latter, centered on the unique
characteristics of the dentate gyrus (Treves et al., 2008) and on
the CA3-CA1 differentiation (Treves, 2004).
At a very general level, streams of thoughtmay be conceived as
trajectories among declarative memories. Mathematical models
of memory storage and retrieval in the hippocampus, pioneered
by Marr (1971) and later empowered by the analysis of
the Hopfield model (Amit et al., 1987), conceive episodic
memories as attractor states in the CA1 and CA3 regions of
the hippocampus. While the intrinsic CA3 connectivity would
enable the cued retrieval of temporally-defined scenes of arbitrary
content, CA1 may allow for their limited temporal association,
e.g., the concatenation of scenes within an episode (Kesner et al.,
2002; Treves, 2004). Local recurrent connectivity within cortical
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 January 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 39
Ciaramelli and Treves A Mind Free to Wander
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the model implemented in the Potts network, in its control (center), vmPFC-lesioned (left), and hippocampally-lesioned
(right) versions. The black circles represent schemata, some of which are stored as continuous attractors in vmPFC, that often lead (arrows) to the activation of other
schemata, in multiple interacting sequences. Ongoing activity in the cortex sometimes elicits the activation of memories in the hippocampus (clouds), boosting its
contents with episodic details. Mind-wandering can be initiated by schemata activated by aspects of the current task or endogenously, or by the direct activation of
episodic memories, particularly in vmPFC patients, in which the chain of continuous attractors is weakened. Hippocampal patients, on the other hand, experience
rarer and weaker episodic boosting of their mind-wandering chains.
regions is thought to endow them, too, with attractor states,
with contents specific to each region. The collection of local
attractor networks can engage in “latching” dynamics, when
in response to a cue the whole neocortex does not just settle
into a single attractor (whether instantaneous like a snapshot or
somewhat extended in time), but instead continues to hop from
one attractor to the next (Treves, 2005). Mathematically defined
“Potts” networks have been shown to undergo, depending on
their parameters (e.g., number of units, number of states they
are endowed with; Kang et al., 2017), phase transitions—abrupt
changes in their dynamics—passing from a “no latching” region
to a “finite latching” region, to an “infinite latching” region, in
which latching dynamics go on spontaneously and indefinitely
(Russo and Treves, 2012; Naim et al., 2018). Importantly,
current work is analyzing how such spontaneous hopping may
be supplemented by schemata stored in parts of the extended
network, e.g., vmPFC.
Mind-wandering (as well as the conflation of memories
in confabulation) is reminiscent of a latching process in
which some of the transitions appear random, others rather
more guided by local schemata. We propose that vmPFC
participates in the mechanics of neocortical latching, facilitating
congruent consecutive retrieval of stored memories, while their
content is boosted by the hippocampus. vmPFC-mediated
transitions between contents of thought would occur through
the instantiation of specific local schemata (see Gilboa and
Marlatte, 2017, for a review). Mathematizing the psychological
concept, a “schema” may be conceived as the association of
attractor state k in local network i with the subsequent attractor
state l in local network j, an association extracted over multiple
similar occurrences (Gilboa and Marlatte, 2017). If σ ki denotes
the activation of attractor k in network i, the schema could
be instantiated in a Potts network by adding to its “free-
energy” function a term proportional to σ ki ·σ
l
j , which would
cause substantial interference among memories. The latching
Potts network, however, naturally envisages additional ramping
variables θki , which parametrize how long a temporally extended
attractor σ ki has been activated. A free-energy term proportional
to θki ·σ
l
j facilitates schema-guided transitions, in relation to the
contents represented by local networks i and j (for example, in
vmPFC, or in Broca’s area), while the remaining content may
be stationary, or undergo spontaneous transitions, or be guided
by other schemata. On the other hand, a Potts model connected
with a hippocampal model may utilize it as an “episodic content
booster,” reinvigorating streams of thoughts in the cortex, and is
expected to show saltatory characteristics, in that hippocampal
output representations would be activated not too frequently
relative to the sequence of neocortical states.
Despite many open issues requiring detailed model analysis,
we expect it to support our view that the hippocampus fuels
voluntary as well as spontaneous cognition with detail-rich
scenes/snapshots, whereas vmPFC (among areas storing specific
schemata) governs appropriate latching acrossmemory attractors
to form extended events. Our model and related predictions
are portrayed in Figure 1. In healthy controls, attention shifts
from an ongoing task inward, toward mentally constructed
experiences. These flow, guided by relevant schemata and
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boosted by context-rich hippocampal memories. A lesion to the
hippocampal component is expected to result in reduced episodic
content boosts, with preserved schema-driven transitions: the
flow of thoughts now “browses” on context-poor items/moments.
Conversely, a lesion to vmPFC is expected to disarticulate
mind-wandering, leaving it over-dependent on the hippocampal
content booster: ephemeral, inconsequential mind-wandering is
now triggered by the infrequent hippocampal output and poorly
assisted by schema-guided construction processes.
Future neuropsychological studies and computational
analyses will help test and refine the model and clarify the
role of vmPFC vs. the hippocampus in the dynamics of
mind-wandering. For example, if vmPFC is necessary to
initiate and maintain mind-wandering endogenously, vmPFC
lesions should lead to reduced mind-wandering when no
cue is provided or no strong memory attractor is probed
(due to weak schema-assisted latching), but preserve mind-
wandering if externally cued, especially in response to highly
imaginable words or strong words probing schemas (e.g.,
the self, one’s own goals), which both act as strong retrieval
cues (McVay and Kane, 2013; Vannucci et al., 2017). With
hippocampal lesions, external cues are expected to be less
beneficial. Another prediction pertains to the temporal trajectory
and content of mind-wandering following an external trigger.
In patients/networks with vmPFC lesions, mind-wandering
is expected to be largely limited to short delays after the
external cue (weak latching), and to often depart from the
schema probed by the cue, to reflect diverse hippocampal
output. Conversely, in patients/networks with hippocampal
lesions, mind-wandering should be more long-lasting but
more constrained in content to schema-instructed latching
dynamics.
Observing a phase-dependent behavior as in a Potts
network (endowed with a hippocampal content booster) would
substantially improve our understanding of the role of vmPFC
in the schema-driven temporal development of mind-wandering
and constructed experience. An abnormal balance between
spontaneous and schema-guided latching dynamics may account
for the somewhat paradoxical behaviors of vmPFC patients,
who range, depending on the experimental condition, from
being unable to retrieve any memory or engage in mind-
wandering to floridly confabulate and make off-task associations
(Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; Ciaramelli and Ghetti, 2007;
Bertossi and Ciaramelli, 2016). Understanding the model may
also facilitate clinical applications. Previous attempts to reduce
confabulation have reinforced retrieval goals (Ciaramelli, 2008)
or muﬄed the cognitive resources available for task-irrelevant
associations (Ciaramelli et al., 2009). In hindsight, we were
acting on parameters of a Potts network—what we can now
do explicitly, to study, and hopefully manage thought-flow
impairments.
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